The decoy-state method has been developed rapidly in quantum key distribution (QKD) since it is immune to photon-number splitting attacks. However, two basis detector efficiency asymmetry, which exists in realistic scenarios, has been ignored in the prior results. By using the recent 4-intensity decoy-state optimization protocol, we report the first implementation of high-rate QKD with asymmetric basis detector efficiency, demonstrating 1.9 to 33.2 times higher key rate than previous protocols in the situation of large basis detector efficiency asymmetry. The results ruled out an implicitly assumption in QKD that the efficiency of Z basis and X basis are restricted to be same. This work pave the way towards a more practical QKD setting. * Nevertheless, the practical applications of QKD combined with the one-time pad scheme are still pinned by low secure key rate. In addition, an implicit assumption for detector model in the existed results is that the efficiencies of Z basis and X basis are almost the same. It seems like a simple assumption but does not always meet realistic scenarios. For instance, it could be resulted from the efficiency asymmetry of single photon detectors in the passive basis choice protocol, or the imperfection during measurment bases switching in the active basis choice protocol. A common approach is reducing higher efficiency to balance detector efficiency asymmetry at the price of introducing additional losses.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has continuously been focused since the first protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 1 . However, the unconditionally security of the ideal BB84 has been frustrated by a lot of realistic imperfections, one prominent of which is the lack of the practical single photon source. It is more feasible for Alice to utilize the attenuated laser, i.e., the weak coherent pulses (WCP) as signal states, which results in a loophole for the photon-number splitting (PNS) attack 2, 3 . Fortunately, based on the original idea by Hwang 4 , the decoy-state method 5, 6 appeared in time. It has dramatically improve the performance of QKD with the attenuated laser by providing better bounds on the gain and the error rate of single photon states. In the past decade, noteworthy theoretical improvements have been proposed to continuously improve the performance of decoy-state QKD [7] [8] [9] [10] . Experiments either over optical fiber or free-space have advanced significantly in the meantime [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . Specially, QKD has been demonstrated at a transmission distance up to 7600 km in free-space 20 and more than 400 km in optical fiber 16, 19 .
Nevertheless, the practical applications of QKD combined with the one-time pad scheme are still pinned by low secure key rate. In addition, an implicit assumption for detector model in the existed results is that the efficiencies of Z basis and X basis are almost the same. It seems like a simple assumption but does not always meet realistic scenarios. For instance, it could be resulted from the efficiency asymmetry of single photon detectors in the passive basis choice protocol, or the imperfection during measurment bases switching in the active basis choice protocol. A common approach is reducing higher efficiency to balance detector efficiency asymmetry at the price of introducing additional losses.
Here, by making simple modifications to a commercial QKD system, we implement a novel 4-intensity decoy-state QKD protocol using biased bases 21 , which can provide higher key rate than previous traditional 3-intensity protocols with unbiased bases, especially in a large degree of basis detector efficiency asymmetry. Setting the detector efficiency asymmetry of two bases η Z /η X = 2 and 10 respectively, we change channel distance over different lengths of standard telecom fiber up to 150 km and demonstrate as much as 1.9 to 33.2 times higher key rate than previous protocols. These results have moved QKD towards a more practical setting.
THEORY
In the novel 4-intensity QKD protocol 21 , Alice prepares two different coherent sources in the Z basis with intensities µ Z 1 and µ Z 2 ; and two different coherent sources in the X basis with intensities µ X 1 and µ X 2 , with probabilities p α j (α = Z, X; j = 1, 2) respectively.
Without losing the generality, we assume µ α 1 < µ α 2 (α = Z, X). The coherent state whose phase is selected uniformly at random can be regard as a mixture of photon number states,
i.e., ρ α j = k a k,α j |k k| with a k,α j = e −µα j µ k α j /k! for α = Z, X and j = 1, 2. In the protocol, Bob measures the received pulses in the Z and X bases with probabilities q Z and q X respectively. After the preparation and measurement of N t pulses, Alice and Bob obtain the observable N ω α j and M ω α j which are the number of successful counts and error counts when Alice sends the pulses from source α j and Bob measures them in the ω basis. Here α and ω can take both Z and X. We also denote S ω α j and T ω α j as the yield and error yield, respectively, with S
In Ref. 21 , a delicate point has been put forward that even in the asymptotic case, i.e.,
is the yield of k-photon pulses prepared from source α j and measured in the ω basis. The reason s
,X is simply due to the asymmetry of detection efficiencies and dark counts in different bases. Such asymmetry can come from either imperfect control of two of the devices inside Labs, or Eve's attack. In order to take a better treatment, the decoy-state method jointly in different bases has been studied 21 . For this goal, the observed number of counts of pulses prepared in one basis but measured in another basis shall be used. In particular, it is assumed that s In all real experiment, the total number of pulses sent by Alice is finite. In order to extract the secret final key, we have to consider the effect of statistical fluctuations caused by the finite size. In this case, yields of the same state out of different sources are not always rigorously equal to each other, i.e., s 
and
where A 0,2
). By using the multiplicative form of the Chernoff bound, with a fixed failure probability , we can give an interval of S ω α j with the observable S
which can bound the value of S ω α j with a probability of at least 1 − . Explicitly, we have
With the mean values s ω,L 1 defined in Eq. (1), the lower bounds of s
where
, ). Here and after, we define N
of k-photon pulses prepared in source α j and measured in the basis ω.
Second, we can also formulate the phase-flip error rate of single-photon states. Explicitly,
we have
In a finite-key-size case, we can apply the large data size approximation of the random sampling method to upper bound the phase error rate e p,Z 1 of single-photon pulses prepared and measured in the Z basis with the failure probability
where θ
and e 1 = e X,U 1,X 1 for simplicity.
Note that e p,Z,U 1 is a function of s X 0 . Straightly, we can also formulate the upper bound of the phase-flip error rate of single-photon counts in the X basis, being denoted by e p,X,U 1 .
We omit the explicit formula here since it is just trivially written analogically to Eq.(5).
Note that s 
and A 0,1
By simply attributing all the errors to the vacuum pulses,
we can upper bound of s
With these preparations, the final key rate of the 4-intensity protocol can be calculated with the following worst-case estimation
over the region for all possible values of s Z 0 and s
respectively. Here
for α = Z, X. Here f is the efficiency factor of the error-correction method used, further and compress the pulses width, which guarantees that the pulse width is smaller than the detector effective gate width after long distance propagation.
The synchronization pulses are generated by a 1570 nm DFB laser operating at 100 kHz.
In order to synchronize the entire experimental systems and reduce optical fiber costs, the synchronization pulses emitted from Alice are multiplexed with signal pulses by a 100 G DWDM and transmitted through the same single-mode optical fiber to Bob. A SOA is utilized to amplify the intensity of synchronization pulses to guarantee that Bob's PD receive sufficient optical power. A DWDM inserted before his PD is typically introduced filter undesired noise from the SOA.
Naively, Bob passively selects the measurement basis by a 1×2 SMBS with the splitting ratio of q X . It indicates that the received photons are measured either on the X or Z basis randomly with probabilities of q X and q Z = 1 − q X , respectively. Cooled to −50
InGaAs APDs operating in gated Geiger mode are used to detect signals at 1.25 GHz gating frequency. The effective gating window width is 180 ps and the dead time is 500 ps, which is an optimal trade-off between the detection efficiency and the after pulses rate. The detection efficiency is about 10% at a dark count probability of 2.50 × 10 −7 per gate. For convenience, we inserted two 3 dB or even 10 dB attenuations, one before each of two APDs for X basis, to get a larger efficiency asymmetry and demonstrate the effectiveness of difference protocols.
We thus regard the attenuations as a part of the APDs.
Alice and Bob have to develop a stable polarization reference frame initially owing to the polarization mode dispersion (PMD) effects in long distance single-mode optical fiber. Bob applies corresonding DC voltage on a pair of EPCs to align Alice's polarization states to the polarizing axes of the PBSs inserted before the APDs. The optical misalignment error rate e d is around 1.5%. Note that the optical misalignment error rate of Z and X basis are independent. The polarization can remain stable for more than 20 minutes, which is long enough for our experiment.
RESULTS
Using same system parameters in TableI to perform a numerical optimization for consistency and taking the effects of statistical fluctuations into account, we implement three decoy-state BB84 protocols: (I) traditional 3-intensity protocol 7 with basis detector efficiency symmetry, where Bob reduce higher detecotor efficiency to balance asymemetry η Z = η X ; (II) 3-intensity protocol with basis detector efficiencies asymmetry 21 , where in both bases, Alice select the same intensities and proportions, and Bob measures the received pulses with the same probabilities, that is, q Z = q X = 50%; (III) 4-intensity protocol 21 , where
In all protocols, the signal pulses µ Z 2 and µ X 2 are used for key generation, while other intensity pulses are used as decoy states to estimate the amount of privacy amplification necessary. The extra insertion loss in Bob is about 2. In the first experiment, we set the detector efficiency of the InGaAs APD η Z = 10% and η X = 5%, that is, the asymmetry η Z /η X = 2, and change the distance between Alice and
Bob from 87 km to 150 km. The results are shown in FIG.2 (a) . Consequently, 4-intensity protocol dramatically gives measurable advantage over two types of 3-intensity protocol.
For example, 4-intensity protocol obtain a key rate of 39 kbps in 87 km, which is 3.0 times that of 3-intensity protocol and 4.8 times that of 3-intensity protocol with basis detector efficiencies symmetry. And 4-intensity yield a secret key rate of 36.7 bps in a maximal distance of 150 km. In contrast, not even a bit of secure key can be extracted with both two types of 3-intensity. In the second experiment, we increase the mismatch on purpose and set η Z = 10% and η X = 1%. FIG. 2(b) presents the experiment results. The experiment data of the 87 km case is used as an example to demonstrate the improvement of 4-intensity protocol. 4-intensity protocol obtain a key rate of 20 kbps in 87 km, which is 3.6 times that of 3-intensity protocol and 33.2 times that of 3-intensity protocol with basis detector efficiencies symmetry.
CONCLUSION
In summary, we have demonstrated, for the first time, an implementation of decoy-state QKD system with asymmetric basis detector efficiencies by the recent 4-intensity decoy-state optimization protocol. The secure key rate is higher than previous traditional 3-intensity protocols with unbiased bases results by 1.9 to 33.2 times. Besides, our results ruled out an implicitly assumption in QKD that the efficiency of Z basis and X basis are restricted to be same. Therefore, the implementation is an excellent candidate for future quantum key distribution. (a) the detector efficiency {η Z , η X } is fixed at {10%, 5%},while the experimental transmission distance are selected at 87, 126, 141 and 150 km. (b) the detector efficiency {η Z , η X } is fixed at {10%, 1%}, while the experimental transmission distance are selected at 62, 87, 107 and 126 km. Blue squares, green diamonds and red circles, respectively, refers to (I) traditional 3-intensity protocol 7 basis detector efficiencies symmetry, where Bob reduce higher detecotor effiency to balance asymemetry η Z = η X = 5% or 1%; (II) 3-intensity protocol with basis detector efficiencies asymmetry 21 , where 
